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1 INTRODUCTION 
Econometrics  received its  big  boost  from  applications  to  macroeconomic 
problems. Today, many economists have become wary of the use of advanced 
econometric methods in the construction of big macroeconomic models. At 
the same time, the increased availability of large micro data sets has opened up 
a vast field in which econometric techniques can be applied more appropri- 
ately. Micro data have their own peculiarities which have spawned many new 
research directions in econometrics such as 'latent variables,' 'limited depen- 
dent variables' and 'the analysis of panel data.' 
A  distinctive feature of empirical microeconomic models is the much closer 
connection between  economic theory,  econometric method  and  empirical 
implementation  than  in  the  big  macro  models.  Economic theory is  often 
formulated in terms of individual decision-making units like households, and 
having data on the individual units makes it possible to use the theory more 
fruitfully and to test it more severely. This closer connection between theory 
and data also more narrowly defines the appropriate econometric methods to 
be used. 
One of the  areas  where economic theory and econometric methodology 
have cooperated most closely is that of household labor supply. Where Dutch 
economists were in the forefront of their profession when econometrics was 
applied  to  macroeconomics,  it  is  perhaps  only natural  that  now  they  are 
lagging behind somewhat when applying econometrics to microeconomics. 
In the area of household labor supply, with which this paper is concerned, 
there are only a few Dutch papers that use micro data to analyse household 
labor supply, and almost all of them are written by one person, J. Siegers of the 
University of Utrecht. His research concentrates on female labor force par- 
ticipation and its relation with fertility. For the purpose of this paper his two 
papers on the joint labor supply of married couples are relevant, both co- 
authored by P.S.A. Renaud. 
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In Renaud and Siegers (1983a) a rather large Dutch data set is used to model 
both the participation and the number of hours worked by the male and female 
partners in a family. 1 The participation equations are estimated by means of 
probit  analysis.  The  hours  equations  are  estimated  by Tobit  analysis.  All 
equations are linear and estimated separately. Explanatory variables are male 
and female wage rates,  age, and a number of dummies to represent family 
composition. 
In Renaud and Siegers (1983b) the same data set is used to estimate a variant 
of a  model  proposed  by Leuthold  (1968).  Now only hours  equations  are 
estimated by Tobit analysis for female hours and by regression for male hours. 
The specifications are again linear and the explanatory variables are almost the 
same as in the previous article, with one exception. The partner's wage rate 
has been replaced by the partner's labor income. 
However valuable these studies may be, they are subject to a number of 
limitations.  First  of all,  the linear  specifications used are  quite restrictive, 
implying for instance that labor supply functions are either everywhere for- 
ward-bending or everywhere backward-bending. Secondly, the model used in 
Renaud and Siegers (1983a)  is not derived from a well-developed theory of 
household  behavior.  Neoclassical  theory  would  imply  restrictions  on  the 
parameters  across the participation  and  hours equations,  for example,  but 
such restrictions are neither imposed nor tested. The Leuthold model underly- 
ing the analysis in Renaud and Siegers (1983b) implies a simultaneity between 
the labor incomes of husband and wife, but in the estimation this simultaneity 
is not taken into account so that the parameter estimates are probably inconsis- 
tent. 
In this paper we start from the neoclassical theory of labor supply, which 
takes the household as a homogeneous decision-making unit.  Although this 
may seem a strong assumption to some, our empirical analysis shows that the 
restrictions  implied  by the  neoclassical  theory hold  up  rather  well.  As  an 
empirical specification we adopt the Almost Ideal Demand System proposed 
by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a,  1980b).  This system is derived from neo- 
classical theory and it is quite flexible. Labor supply functions can be forward- 
bending  in  a  certain  range  of wages and  backward-bending  in  a  different 
range.  We estimate  female  and  male labor supply as one system, thereby 
attaining maximal efficiency of the estimates. 
One important assumption in the neoclassical model is that the household 
decision is subiect to no other restrictions than a budget constraint and a time 
constraint.  So institutional restrictions are ignored.  In our data we have not 
only information on how many hours each partner works per week, but also on 
how many hours they would like to work. It is the extra availability of this latter 
variable  which  allows  us  to  investigate  the  biasing  effects of institutional 
constraints. 
1  The data set used is known as AVO-79. The analysis covers 3114 households. The same data set 
was also used by Hartog and Theeuwes (1983). HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY  23 
Once we have estimated the model and have found that the neoclassical 
framework fits the data rather well, we go on to illustrate the value of a model 
rooted firmly in theory for the analysis of policy issues. We briefly investigate 
the measurement of the cost of children and the effects of a rationing of male 
labor supply, proposed by many people in the Netherlands  as a  means of 
reducing unemployment, on female labor supply. 
Although we admit to be rather pleased by the empirical results obtained, 
we should stress that this paper is primarily an investigation into the potential 
of the Almost Ideal Demand System as a model for household labor supply. 
Before the results can be used in policy analysis with a fair degree of con- 
fidence, quite a few extra steps have to be taken. In the concluding section we 
outline a number of these steps. 
In order not to burden the presentation with a number of technicalities from 
neoclassical demand theory or from econometrics, most mathematical details 
have been relegated to three appendices. 
2 THE MODEL 
We only consider households  z with both a male and a female partner present. 
Each household is supposed to behave as if it maximizes a well-behaved utility 
function U(l  m,  lp y), where I  m is male leisure, l~ is female leisure and y is total 
household consumption. Maximization of the household utility function takes 
place subject to a full income constraint: 
Wm l m ~-  wflf +  y  =  Y-  IX +  wf T  +  w,,  T,  (2.1) 
where w  m and w  s are the male and female wage rate respectively, T is the total 
number of hours available per time period and ~  is unearned family income  3 
(e.g.  property income or welfare benefits); Y is full income. 
Maximization of the  utility function subject  to  (2.1)  yields demand for 
leisure functions and a demand for consumption function. The mathematical 
form of these functions depends on the specification of the utility function. 
Since economic theory is unspecific about the functional form of demand 
functions (or utility functions, for that matter), it is advisable to choose a 
flexible specification so that the data help to specify the functional form of the 
demand equations.  One particularly convenient specification of the flexible 
functional form variety is the Almost Ideal Demand System developed by 
Deaton  and  Muellbauer  (1980a,  1980b).  In  Appendix  A  we  give  a  brief 
exposition of this system. There it is also shown that in the present context it 
looks as follows: 
=  *  -~  ~mf log w~  Sm  am  +  Vm,, log W  m  * -~ ~rny log p*  + 
tim log Y  -  fl,~  . a  (2.2) 
2  'Household' and 'family' are used as synonyms. 
3  The wage rates and unearned income are all measured after taxes. 24  P. KOOREMAN  AND A. KAPTEYN 
ss =  at +  gmt log w* +  Xft log w~  +  Xyy log p*  + 
log Y-  a 
where s m =  w m lm/Y,  S  s =  W  t ls/Y and 
p*  =  NOy 




~  =  NO;.  wt, 
with N  the number of persons in a family. 
(2.6) 
and 
,  1 
a  =  a o +  %, log w* +  a i log w~  +  O;y log p*  + ~  ~mm log  2 W,* 
1 
+  X,,,tlog  W,* log W  7  +  ~my log W* logp*  + ~  xitlog2 W  7 
,  1 
+  XSy log Wj  log p*  +  ~  ~yy log2p*  (2.7) 
ay =  1 --  a m --a i  (2.8) 
Ymy =  --Ymm -- Ymt  (2.9) 
XSy =  -Xtt-  7mS  (2.10) 
Xyy =  -Xmy -  X#  (2.11) 
The parameters ao, am,  ai, tim, ~S' 7mm, Xmt' Xtt' O? 0 m, 0/have to be estimated. 
The demand equations are written in share form; s m is the share of male 
leisure in the household's full income and s  i is the share of female leisure. Of 
course, one can also derive a corresponding demand equation for s,,, the share 
of total consumption in full income. Since, according to (2.1), s  s + s m + sy =  1, 
this equation will not provide any new information. Hence it is omitted. 
The effect of family size on labor supply has been modelled here as a quasi- 
price effect along the lines set out in Barten (1964).  Of course, the number of 
persons in a family is a rather crude indicator of family composition and one 
could  think  of including more  indicators,  such  as  the  number of children 
younger than six. To keep the number of parameters to manageable propor- 
tions we will stick to this rather simple specification. In any case, we allow the 
effect of family size to be different for different expenditure categories. As 
such it is more general than the specification used by Ray (1982). 
The full income shares s m and s  t are non-negative and are bounded from HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY  25 
above. If both partners decide not to work, s~ and s  i attain their maximum, 
respectively WmT/Y and wiT/Y.  Of course, a demand-for-leisure equation is 
equivalent with a labor-supply equation and we shall also refer to (2.2) and 
(2.3) as labor-supply equations. 
One of the assumptions underlying the neoclassical model sketched here is 
that people are free to choose the number of hours they work. Obviously, in 
practice there may be various institutional constraints on the number of hours 
one is able to work. A particular feature of the data we use is that it not only 
contains information on the number of hours household members work, but it 
also tells us how many hours each household member would like to work at the 
going wage rate. We refer to the former concept as actual hours and to the 
latter as preferred hours. We will estimate the model twice, once to explain 
actual working hours and once to explain preferred working hours. 
3 THE DATA 
The labor-supply model (2.2)-(2.11) has been estimated for data from a labor 
mobility survey in  the  Netherlands,  conducted in  the  fall  of 1982 by the 
Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics and the Institute for Social Research 
of Tilburg University. The sample has been drawn randomly from the popula- 
tion of all households in the Netherlands whose head is between 18 and 65 
years of age. The sample contains 1315 households. Within each household 
each member of 18 years or over has been interviewed. As a result the sample 
contains 2677 respondents. 
For our empirical analysis we only consider households where both the male 
and the female partner work in a paid job for at least 15 hours per week. The 15 
hours cut-off point is dictated by the survey design by which certain items of 
information are not collected for people who work less than 15 hours per week. 
As  a  result,  we analyse a  sample of 139 households for whom a  sufficient 
amount of information has been collected to be able to estimate model (2.2)- 
(2.11). 
Although, from a theoretical point of view the preferred hours version of 
the model would seem to be superior to the actual hours version, there are 
some data problems that may adversely affect the quality of the parameter 
estimates in the preferred hours version. First of all, there are some context 
effects: Question 198 of the questionnaire asks whether the respondent would 
prefer to work more hours than he or she does at the moment, or fewer hours, 
or just the present number of hours. In this question, no mention is made of 
the financial consequences of changing the number of hours worked. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that out of our 139 households there are only 3 males and 
only 5 females who would like to work more hours, whereas 39 males and 50 
females would like to work less. 
The next question, 199, then asks whether the respondent is willing to work 
less and have a proportionately lower income. The respondents who dare to 26  P. KOOREMAN  AND A. KAPTEYN 
say no to this question are then asked (question 200): 'Why not?' Question 201 
finally asks the respondents how many hours they would prefer to work if their 
present incomeper hour would remain constant. The phrase 'income per hour' 
may have been understood by some as saying that their total labor income 
would remain constant. Thus it appears that both the sequence of questions 
preceding the preferred-number-of-hours question and the phrasing of the 
question itself tend to bias the respondent's answer in a downward direction. 
There is an additional econometric problem caused by the survey design. 
The preferred-number-of-hours question is only asked of respondents who 
work at least 15 hours a week in a paid job. So those respondents who work less 
than 15 hours but would like to work more than 15 hours are left out of our 
sample of 139 households. This causes an extra selection bias for the preferred 
hours version which does not arise with the actual hours version. See Appen- 
dix B for technical details. 
4 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The estimation method is outlined in Appendix B. Here we first present the 
parameter estimates in Table 1. Next we discuss their economic significance. 
The a's and V's are significant at the 5% level for both specifications, except for 
yflin the preferred hours version. Thefi's are generally insignificant and so are 
the O's. One should be careful, however, to base any far-reaching conclusion 
on the  significance or nonsignificance of parameters.  The model is highly 
nonlinear, so that one cannot generally associate a parameter with a particular 
variable, as in a linear model. A nonsignificant coefficient, therefore, does not 
necessarily point to the possibility that a particular explanatory variable could 
be discarded without loosing much predictive power. In a nonlinear context 
parameters also determine the curvature of the function and often it is not 
possible to look at parameters in isolation. For that reason we do not try, 
generally, to interpret parameters separately but concentrate on the perform- 
ance of the model as a whole. 
In the first place, we notice that the log-likelihoods for the two versions do 
not differ very much,  although it  appears  that  actual hours are  explained 
somewhat better by the model than preferred hours. Since the two versions of 
the  model  are  non-nested  one  cannot  draw  any firm inference from  this 
difference in log-likelihood, 
Secondly, although the t-values for the 0-estimates might suggest that family 
size can be neglected as a determinant of labor supply, a likelihood ratio test of 
the hypothesis 0 m =  Of =  0y =  0 rejects this hypothesis at the 5% significance 
level (cf.  the bottom of Table 1). 
In the third place, the neoclassical model of household utility maximization 
requires  the  own  welfare  compensated  (Hicksian)  price  elasticities  to  be 
negative and, more generally, the cost function (see Appendix A) should be 
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TABLE 1 - PARAMETER ESTIMATES" (ASYMPTOTIC t-VALUES IN PARENTHESES) 
Dependent Variable:  Preferred Hours  Actual Hours 
Parameters 
am  0.31  0.29 
(6.5)  (6.2) 
af  0,23  0.38 
(4.9)  (6.1) 
7mrn  0.23  0.18 
(14.3)  (8.0) 
X-,i  -0.16  -0.16 
(-6.6)  (-12.5) 
;~Ir  0.08  0.20 
(1,2)  (19.7) 
tim  --0.07  0.11 
(-1.1)  (1.2) 
~f  0.18  -0.15 
(2.4)  (-1.6) 
Om  0.05  0.36 
(0.2)  (O.6) 
Of  0.22  0.22 
(0.3)  (0.8) 
G  0.03  0.14 
(0.1)  (0.5) 
log-likelihood (up to an additive constant)  641.8  658.7 
log-likelihood when Om= 0  I =  0y =  0  637.5  653.8 
Likelihood ratio test  b 
statistic for Om =  0~" =  Oy =  0  8.6  9.8 
a  a0 was fixed a priori for computational reasons (see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and Ray 
(1982)). 
b  This  statistic follows asymptotically  a x2-distribution with three degrees of freedom. The 
critical levels for 5% and 2.5% are 7.81 and 9.35, respectively. 
satisfied (See Appendix A  for details). It turns out that for preferred hours the 
own compensated price elasticity is negative for 89% of the observations. For 
actual hours the own compensated price effect is negative in 80% of all cases. 
The  negativity of the  own  compensated  price  effect  is  only  a  necessary 
condition for consistency of the observations with utility maximization within 
our model. When we check the necessary and sufficient concavity conditions, 
we find that for the preferred hours specification 79% of all households behave 
consistent with utility maximization within our model, whereas 60% do so for 
the actual hours specification.  ~ 
4  The fact that some observations fail the concavity conditions only means that not all house- 
holds seem to maximize the utility function underlying the model given in section 2. For these 
households the model may be too limited as a description of their behavior. Of course, if utility is 
defined broadly enough, everybody maximizes utility all the time. 28  P. KOOREMAN AND A. KAPTEYN 
Since  any empirical model is  bound  to  suffer from some degree of mis- 
specification,  and  because  there  are  random  factors  not  captured  by  the 
model, these numbers are quite encouraging. Also, in comparison with other 
studies, these numbers compare favorably. Wales and Woodland (1976), for 
example, find rejection of utility maximization for approximately 50% of their 
data points. 
It is also worth noting that the preferred hours specification is doing better in 
this respect than the actual hours specification. A  cross-classification of the 
results of the concavity tests shows that for 47% of all households the preferred 
hours  as  well  as the  actual  hours  are consistent  with  utility  maximization, 
whereas  for  8%  consistency  is  achieved  in  neither  case.  For  32%  of  all 
observations we find consistency for the preferred hours specification but not 
for the actual hours specification. Apparently, institutional and other restric- 
tions on numbers of hours worked force these households away from a utility 
maximum. For only 13%  of all households we find consistency in the actual 
hours case but not in the preferred hours case. 
Encouraged by these results,  we will take utility maximization within our 
model as our maintained hypothesis and explore some further implications of 
the empirical results.  In Table 2 we present, for both versions, the welfare 
compensated elasticities of working hours and total consumption with respect 
to the wage rate and price of consumption. 5 All quantities are evaluated at the 
sample mean. 
In both specifications male and female leisure are complements and both are 
substitutes for consumption. So, if either the male or the female wage rate goes 
up, both partners will work less, keeping welfare constant. If the price of total 
consumption goes up, both partners will respond by working more, once again 
keeping welfare constant.  The results do not seem to differ greatly between 
both versions of the model. 
For comparison, Table 3 presents the uncompensated elasticities evaluated 
at the  sample mean and these tell  a  slightly different story. The own price 
effect of male leisure is now positive, indicating that the income effect of a 
TABLE 2 -  COMPENSATED WAGE AND PRICE ELASTICITIES 
AT THE SAMPLE MEAN 
Elasticity of:  male leisure  female leisure  total consumption 
with respect to  preferred  actual  preferred  actual  preferred  actual 
W,i  -  0.03  -  0.13  -  0.03  -  0.04  0.11  0.33 
Wf  -  0.02  -  0.04  -  0.28  -  0.05  0.60  0.15 
p  0.05  0.17  0.31  0.09  -  0.71  -  0.48 
5  We denote the price of consumption by p. In model (2.2)-(2.11) p did not appear because we 
set p = 1, without loss of generality. HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY 
TABLE 3 - UNCOMPENSATED WAGE AND PRICE ELASTICITIES 
AT THE SAMPLE MEAN 
29 
Elasticity of:  male leisure  female leisure  total consumption 
with respect to  preferred  actual  preferred  actual  preferred  actual 
Wm  0.07  0.01  0.16  0.05  0.15  0.47 
W  r  0.02  0.08  -- 0.14  0.00  0.58  0.24 
p  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -- 0.98  -- 0.96 
change in the male wage rate dominates the substitution effect. For the rest, 
the  differences  between  compensated  and  uncompensated  elasticities  are 
small, with the exception of the numbers in the bottom row.  According to 
Table 3 the income and substitution effects for male and female leisure cancel 
almost  exactly.  Consequently,  an  uncompensated  change  in  the  price  of 
consumption would not affect labor supply, but merely reduce consumption 
proportionately. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that these conclusions pertain to the 
sample mean only.  In Fig.  1 we present the complete uncompensated labor 
supply functions for both versions of the model. In all graphs we have indi- 
* respectively.  The  cated  the  sample means  of the wage  rates as  w  7 and  w  m 
flexibility of the Almost Ideal Demand System is borne out by the various 
shapes taken by the labor supply functions. In particular, for the actual hours 
version female labor supply is partly forward-bending and partly backward- 
bending.  In general,  a linear specification would be unduly restrictive.  One 
sees, once again, that the preferred hours version suggests more elastic labor 
supply functions  than the  actual hours version,  especially for female labor 
supply. 
Finally let us compare the own wage elasticities found here with those found 
by Renaud  and  Siegers  (1983a,  1983b).  Since  these  authors  present  labor 
supply elasticities rather than demand for leisure elasticities, we transform our 
elasticities accordingly and obtain the results of Table 4. The differences are 
TABLE 4 - ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES OF LABOR SUPPLY 
WITH RESPECT TO OWN WAGE 
Preferred Actual  Renaud and Siegers  Renaud and Siegers 
hours  hours  (1983a) a  (1983b) b 
Male hours  -  0.25  -  0.03  0.24  0.04 
Female hours  0.79  ' 0.00  1.55  1.79 
a  In this analysis the wages are measured before taxes. 
b  Wages  are measured after taxes. 30  P.  KOOREMAN AND A. KAPTEYN 
hm 
hr 
remarkable.  For male  labor supply the elasticities have opposite signs,  al- 
though the absolute values of all elasticities are rather small. For female labor 
supply the signs are the same, but our biggest estimate, for preferred hours, is 
only  about  half  the  values  found  by Renaud  and  Siegers.  Although  any 
explanation of the differences will have to rest on guesses the some extent, Fig. 
I is suggestive. The female labor supply curve for preferred hours is strongly 
curved, so the value of the elasticity depends very much on the point where it is 
evaluated. Our sample mean of wiis relatively high, because we only consider 
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Using  a  simple  wage  equation with  age  and  education as  explanatory 
variables (estimated on the basis  of the sample of working women with a 
correction for selection bias) we are able to predict a wage rate for all women, 
both working and nonworking. The sample mean of predicted wage rates for all 
families where the male partner is an employed wage earner turns out to be 9.0 
guilders. This point is indicated in the preferred hours version of the female 
labor supply function as wi" One observes that at wi the labor supply function is 
steeper than at w[ The own wage elasticity of female labor supply at d/is equal 
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Thus  the  difference between the  elasticity estimates  may be  due  to  the 
particular point at which these are evaluated. A  correct comparison should 
take into account the complete labor supply functions. Although we tend to 
prefer the Almost Ideal Demand System because of its flexible function form 
and its firm rooting in economic theory, it should be stressed that our estimates 
are only based  on households where both partners are employed, whereas 
Renaud and Siegers use all households. 
5 POLICY SIMULATIONS 
By assuming that household labor supply is consistent with the maximization 
of a well-behaved utility function underlying an empirically estimated labor 
supply system, one can investigate both the welfare effects and the behavioral 
effects of certain policy measures.  We shall successively pay attention to a 
family allowance system and its effect on labor supply and to the effect of 
rationing of male labor supply on female labor supply and household con- 
sumption. 
Under the assumption that family composition is exogenous to our model,  6 
the cost function immediately gives an answer to the question of how much 
income compensation a family with a certain number of children needs to be as 
well off as a family without children. Denote the cost function by c(u, p,  %,, 
wl,  N); i.e.  given a price of total consumption p, wage rates w  m and w  s and 
family size N, it takes full income equal to c to reach utility level u. Then two 
families of sizes N1 and N 2 are equally well off if their full incomes I11 and Y2 
satisfy 
Yl =  c(u, p,  w m,  w r,  N1)  (5.1) 
Y2  c~u, p,  wm,  w~,  U2)" 
That is, the family of size N 1 needs Y1/Y2 as much full income as the family of 
size N2 to reach the same utility level. The ratio (5.1) is usually referred to as a 
(full income) equivalence scale. In general the equivalence scale depends on u, 
the reference level of utility chosen. 7 
Let us take as our reference utility level, the utility of a family of four which 
is facing wages and unearned income equal to the mean values in our sample. 
The cost function corresponding to the Almost Ideal Demand System is given 
in Appendix A. Using the parameter estimates of the model, we have com- 
puted the equivalence scale values for various family sizes. These are given in 
Tables 5 and 6. 
Especially for the preferred hours version (Table 5), the equivalence scale 
6  This  is a rather strong assumption (see Siegers, 1980, Siegers and Zandanel, 1981, Linssen and 
Siegers, 1983). Still, the assumption underlies all of the modern literature on family  equivalence 
scales. We maintain the assumption here, but further research  into its validity  is definitely  needed. 
7  A similar approach as used here was employed by Blundell (1980). HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY  33 
TABLE 5 - FULL INCOME EQUIVALENCE SCALES (PREFERRED HOURS VERSION) 
Family Equivalence  Effect on male labor supply  a 
size  scale  with  without 
compensation  compensation 
Effect on female labor supply  a 
with  without 
compensation  compensation 
2  0.96  0.86  0.89  1.15  1.05 
3  0.98  0.94  0.95  1.06  1.02 
4  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
5  1.01  1.04  1.04  0.95  0.99 
6  1.02  1.08  1.07  0.91  0.97 
7  1.03  1.11  1.09  0.88  0.97 
8  1.04  1.14  1.11  0.85  0.96 
a  Keeping wages constant, these columns present relative changes in number of hours supplied 
when family size changes, relative to size = 4, both when the changes are compensated and when 
they are not. 
TABLE 6 -  FULL INCOME EQUIVALENCE SCALES (ACTUAL HOURS VERSION) 
Family Equivalence  Effect on male labor supply  a 
size  scale  with  without 
compensation  compensation 
Effect on female labor supply  a 
with  without 
compensation  compensation 
2  0.82  1.14  0.98  0.81  1.23 
3  0.92  1.06  1.00  0.92  1.10 
4  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
5  1.07  0.95  1.01  1.06  0.92 
6  1.13  0.92  1.02  1.11  0.85 
7  1.18  0.89  1.02  1.15  0.80 
8  1.23  0.86  1.03  1.19  0.75 
a  Keeping wages constant, these columns present relative changes in number of hours supplied 
when family size changes, relative to size = 4, both when the changes are compensated and when 
they are not. 
values  are  surprisingly  close  to  each  other,  but  also  for  actual  hours  the 
difference in  cost  of living between  a  two-person  family and  one  with  six 
children is lower than usually found with alternative methods (e.g.  Kapteyn 
and Van Praag, 1976, Blokland, 1976). If we accept the model at face value, an 
interpretation might be that the presence of more children makes leisure more 
enjoyable or that time spent in household production is more productive. As a 
result,  the  cost of reaching  a  certain utility level does not increase propor- 
tionally with the extra expenditures to be made on behalf of the children. 
A  more realistic explanation may lie in the sample used for the estimation. 
The 139 households with two income earners that are used in the estimation do 34  P. KOOREMAN AND A. KAPTEYN 
not show very much variation in family size. s This is so because, by definition, 
the households for which the presence of (young) children is an impediment 
for female labor force participation are left out. Although, in principle, our 
estimation method takes the selective nature of the sample into account, this 
lack of variation in family  size is bound to lead to unreliable estimates of family 
size effects. And that is probably what Tables 5 and 6 show. 
The  effects on  labor  supply  are  also  somewhat erratic.  In Table  5  the 
compensated and uncompensated effects run parallel. If family size increases, 
the female works less and the male works more. In Table 6 the uncompensated 
effects run counter to the compensated effects. The uncompensated effects are 
in the same direction as in Table 5. But if we compensate for differences in 
family size, it is the husband who works less when family  size increases and the 
wife who starts working more. Only by incorporating one-earner families into 
the sample will we be able to obtain more reliable estimates of family  composi- 
tion effects. 
Over the last few years there have been various proposals in the Netherlands 
to reduce unemployment  by restricting the number of hours in a full-time job, 
the idea being that if present employees work fewer hours, employers will hire 
extra people to make up for the loss of production. It is not our purpose to 
discuss the merits of this proposal here, but it is of interest to investigate the 
effects of a rationing of the number of hours supplied by the male partner on 
the labor supply of the female partner and on total family consumption. Once 
again, all variables not involved in the simulation are fixed at their sample 
means. Some details of the computation are given in Appendix C. 
The results in Table 7 suggest that a rationing of male working hours will 
lead the female partner to increase her labor supply to such an extent that total 
family consumption will  remain  almost unchanged.  Because  the  average 
TABLE 7 -  EFFECT OF RATIONING ON FEMALE LABOR SUPPLY 
AND TOTAL FAMILY CONSUMPTION 
Percentage reduction  Actual hours  Preferred hours 
number of working 
hours of male  hm  hf  %  y  %  hm  hf  %  y  % 
change  change  change  change 
in hy  in y  in h  s  in y 
0  41.0 30.3  0  874  0  36.2 25.4  0  760  0 
5  39.0 33.6+10.9  882  +0.9  34.4 27.2+  7.1  755  -0.7 
10  36.9 36.2  +  19.5  881  +0.8  32.6 29.2  +  15.0  751  -  1.2 
20  32.8 40.2  +32.7  867  -0.8  29.0 32.8  +29.1  741  -2.5 
8  Number of children:  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Number of observations:  86  10  32  7  3  1. HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY  35 
female wage rate is lower than the average male wage rate, the increase in 
female labor supply needed to keep consumption unchanged is bigger than the 
corresponding reduction of male working hours. 
An anomaly in Table 7 would seem to be that the 10% rationed case for the 
actual  hours  version corresponds to  a  working week which  is  still  slightly 
longer than the preferred working week without rationing. We have argued in 
section 3, however, that the preferred hours reported are probably underesti- 
mates.  Hence it  does not make  much  sense to  compare  the levels of the 
preferred number of hours to the actual number of hours. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper is mainly a methodological exploration of the applicability of the 
Almost Ideal Demand System to Dutch individual household survey data on 
labor supply. The system has proved its flexibility and tests of whether house- 
hold utility maximization is consistent with our model turn out favorably. The 
firm rooting in neoclassical demand theory makes the system ideally suited for 
policy analysis.  As  two  examples,  we have  dealt  with  compensations  for 
differences in family size and the possible effects on female labor supply and 
total household consumption of rationing of male labor supply. 
Having established its potential,  considerable efforts will have to go into 
refining and extending the model. These improvement include: 
-  Using a larger sample by also including one-earner families. This requires 
the incorporation of rationing theory. 
-  A more sophisticated model for the effects of family composition. 
-  A more appropriate modelling of sample selectivity for the preferred hours 
version. 
If longitudinal data were available, we could add to this list: 
-  Dynamizing the model by incorporating habit formation, so that long-run 
and short-run labor supply responses can be disentangled. 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A  -  THE ALMOST IDEAL DEMAND SYSTEM AND THE INCORPORA- 
TION OF FAMILY SIZE EFFECTS 
Consider a household with utility function U(q 1  .....  qn) which maximizes this 
utility function subject to a budget constraint: 
~Pi qi =  Y,  (A.1) 
i=1 
wherepi and qi are the price and quantity of the i-th good, i = 1,..., n, and Yis 36  P. KOOREMAN  AND A. KAPTEYN 
income. The result of the utility maximization subject to the budget constraint 
is a set of demand functions. 
Dual to the utility function is the cost function c(u, Pl ....  , Pn), representing 
the minimum amount of money required to reach utility level u, given prices 
P~,  ..., Pn.  It  is  well-known that  differentiation of the  cost  function with 
respect to prices directly gives the demand functions corresponding to utility 
maximization. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a,  1980b)  propose the following 
cost function: 
log c(u, p)  =  a(p)  +  u  b(p),  (A.2) 
where p  =  (Pl, •.., P,)' and where a(p) and b(p) are specified as follows: 
1 
a(p)  ao  +  ~c~klogpkk  +  2  ~  ~Tk~logpklogpj.  (A.3) 
b(p)  --  flo  ~  Pgk'  (A.4) 
k 
where ao,  %,  g~i,  flo, flk are parameters. The parameters satisfy 
k  k  k 
Since the cost function is quadratic in the logs of prices it can serve as a local 
second-order approximation to an  arbitrary cost function. Hence,  the cost 
function has a so-called flexible form. 
Differentiating the cost function with respect to prices leads to the com- 
pensated (Hicksian) demand functions for the utility level u. By next solving 
(A.2) for u and substituting the solution for u into the compensated demand 
functions, we obtain the uncompensated demand functions. In share form 
these look as follows: 
si  ai  +  Y', 7ij log P2 +  fli log  Y  -  fii " a,  i  =  1 .....  n  (A.6) 
J 
where s~ =  Pi q~/Y. 
In  this  model the  effect of family composition can  be  introduced quite 
naturally by following an approach from Batten (1964).  Let the family utility 
function be redefined in per capita terms: 
U  =  u(ql,  q2 ,...,  q~=  U(Xl,  ..., x,),  (A.7) 
\rnl  m2  m,j 
where x i -  q/mi,  i =  1 .....  n, and where mi is the number of equivalent adults in 
the household with respect to the i-th good. The budget constraint can be 
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Z  P' q~  ~p~  m,  q~ =  ~  p*  xi  =  Y,  (A.8) 
i  i  l'Yli  i 
with p*= Pi m~. Thus family size effects are introduced as pseudo-price  effects. 
The incorporation of family size effects into the model simply takes place by 
replacing all p~ in (A.3) and (A.4) by p~ 
The last step to be taken is to find a  reasonable specification for m~ as a 
function of family composition. We propose the following simple form: 
in i =  N °i,  (A.9) 
where N  is the number of family members. 
For the case considered in this paper there are three goods, female leisure 
with price  wi, male leisure with price  w m and total consumption with price 
equal to one. Taking this into account, model (2.2)-(2.11)  is equivalent with 
the model discussed here. 
In section 4 a check of the negativity conditions per observation is reported. 
The negativity conditions refer to the fact that the matrix of derivatives of 
Hicksian demand functions with respect to all prices must be negative semi- 
definite. This condition is equivalent to concavity of the cost function. Con- 
cavity of the cost function is necessary since household utility maximization is 
equivalent with (dual to) minimization of expenditures for a given utility level. 
(See e.g.  Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a, p. 39). The cost function is concave if 
and only if the matrix with elements 
cij =  ro  +  fi~ fij {log(Y)-a}  -  si 6q +  si sj,  i, .i =  in, f,  y  (A.10) 
where 6q is one if i = j and zero otherwise is negative semidefinite. A necessary 
condition for negativity is that the own compensated (Hicksian) price elasticity 
is negative. 
For the concavity checks reported in section 4 we have used (A.10) with the 
observed values of s  i and s i inserted. We might also have used predicted values 
of sj and si,  but since we are checking the consistency of actual: choice (or 
preferred ones) with utility maximization, it is more natural to use the ob- 
served values. 
APPENDIX B -  DETAILS OF ESTIMATION 
The budget shares s m and sf in (2.2)  and (2.3)  are bounded from below and 
from above.  The lower bound (i.e.  zero leisure,  or working 168 hours per 
week)  is  never  achieved,  so  we  neglect it.  The  upper  bound  is  achieved 
whenever a male or female decides not to work in a paid job. In the empirical 
analysis we only use observations on households where both the male and the 
female work  at least  15  hours  per week  (cf.  section  3).  In  the  estimation 
procedure we have to take this sample selection rule into account. 38  P. KOOREMAN AND A. KAPTEYN 
Since there are not many households where the female partner works more 
than 15 hours a week and the male works less than 15 hours per week, we only 
take into account the more stringent sample selection rule for female labor 
supply. Thus we consider a system of two equations and a sample selection rule 
according to which a household is only observed if the dependent variable of 
the second equation falls within a certain range. Without loss of generality we 
can describe that situation as follows9: 
Yi=  X'fl,  +  el,  i=  m, f.  (B.1) 
where we assume e~ to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance a 2. 
In (2.2) and (2.3) there are restrictions on the elements off, The restriction on 
the budget share of female leisure is expressed as Yj>0, and we only observe 
households if YI>0. 
There it holds that 
E(e, IYI>O )  =  E[eilef>-X'fif]  =  2  o¢/of,  i  =  m, f  (B.2) 
with 2  =  n(L)/(1-N(L)),  where  L  =  -X'ff/of  and  n(.)  and  N(.)  are  the 
standard  normal  density  and  distribution  function  respectively.  If y  were 
known we could estimate fi~ consistently by means of joint restricted  1° max- 
imum likelihood applied to 
Y~ =  X'f,  +  6,2,  i =  m, f  (B.3) 
where d i =  o¢/o  I.  Since 2 is unknown it has to be estimated. We employ the 
estimation method developed by Amemiya (1973). 
He observes that 
E[ l r>-x'f3  =  x'f  s  -X%]  +  o/  (B.4) 
Amemiya therefore estimates fir from 
Y¢X% + o/ + ,,  (B.5) 
with q  =  ej2  -  of L  ef -  off, using (Xl~t.,  1)'  as instruments;  1~. is the least 
squares prediction of YI from (B.1). He shows that this procedure produces a 
consistent estimate of fir and of  2. Consequently, one can derive L  and next 2. 
This  estimate  of 2  is  used  in  (B.3)  and  the  parameters  in  (B.3)  are  next 
estimated by means of maximum likelihood. In the first step we have ignored 
the restrictions on the elements offi~. This entails a possible loss of efficiency in 
9  The exposition closely resembles the one given by Blundell and Walker (1982). 
10  Because  of the restrictions on the elements of ft. HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY  39 
the estimation of 4, but it does not impair consistency of the estimates in the 
second step. 
The standard  errors of the parameter  estimates presented in Table 1 are 
based on the ML procedure applied to (B.3), but we have ignored the extra 
uncertainty caused by the fact that 2 in (B.3) has to be estimated first. The 
standard errors presented are therefore underestimates of the true standard 
errors. 
For the preferred hours version the cut-off point has been taken to be equal 
to twelve hours,  being the lowest number of hours any female respondent 
preferred  to  work.  As  indicated  in  section 3,  the  sample  selection  model 
presented does not quite apply to the preferred hours version, because there 
are two sample Selection rules: the number of preferred hours should exceed 
twelve and the number of actual hours should exceed fifteen. In the estimation 
of the preferred hours version the second selection rule has been ignored. 
The second step of the estimation procedure also produces estimates of 6 i in 
(B.3).  For the two versions of the model these turn out to be (asymptotic 
t-values in parentheses): 
preferred hours  actual hours 
d m  0.10  -0.19 
(1.1)  (-2.3) 
6  r  0.29  0.11 
(3.2)  (1.5) 
APPENDIX C -  THE COMPUTATION OF RATIONED SUPPLY FUNCTIONS 
The analysis in this  appendix rests on the theory of rationing  in consumer 
behavior largely developed by Neary and Roberts (1980). Let male leisure be 
restricted: l,, =/~,,. Then we want to derive the demand for female leisure, with 
price  wr,  and total consumption,  with price p.  (In the empirical model the 
money unit has been chosen such thatp is equal to one.) The unrestricted cost 
function is defined as 
c(u, p,  win, wf)  --  min  (w~ lj. +  w,,, l,,, + pylu).  (C.1) 
y, t~, l,. 
The restricted cost function is defined as 
e(u,  p,  w,,,  wil~,  ) =  min  (w  I l  s +  w,,, ~, + pylu,  ~,)  = 
y, ll 
=  rain  (w~lr + pyiu,  ~)  +  w m ~ 
y,l~ 
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Let I'~  m  be the wage rate that would induce the household to choose l,,, =  ~,, in 
the unrationed case. Then it holds that 
c(u, p,  %  we) =  c(., p,  %  wrlgo),  (c.3) 
because at ~,. the rationing would not affect the cost of achieving utility level 
u.  Combining (C.2) and (C.3) yields 
c(u, p,  Win, Wf) =  rain  (w  I l  r + pylu,  ~,) +Wm i,  = 
y,  lj. 
=  min  (w  I l  I + py  +  w,, ~,,lu,/7,)  +  142  m [m --  Wm ~,, 
Y,I  I 
=  e(u,  p,  w ....  wzl~,,)  +  ~,,(~,,,  -  w,,).  (C.4) 
So, we can express the restricted cost function in the unrestricted cost function 
as follows: 
e(u, p,  w=, w/gO  = 4<  p,  ~,,,,  wz) + Uw= -  ~=)  (c.5) 
The restricted demands for female leisure and total consumption are found by 
partial differentiation of the restricted cost function with respect to %.andp. In 
the differentiation one has to take into account the dependence of ~,,, on w~ 
and p,  because  ~m is found by setting l  m =  /~,, in the compensated demand 
function for male leisure and next solving for ~,,. 
So we have for the restricted compensated demand for female leisure: 
~C(U, p, Wrn, W f)  ~Wm  Tm  ~tn  If  Oc(u, p, -win, wf)  +  .  _ 
=  ~w  s  ~Wm  ~Ws  ~Ws 
__  eC(1A, p, Wrn' Wj')  q-  7m " ~W-m  --Tin"  ~Wm  __  ~C(U, p, "Wm, W  f) 
--  c~w;.  0wf  0w  I  0w  I 
(c.6) 
This is just the unrestricted compensated demand function at %, =  ~,,,.  The 
uncompensated demand function is found by solving u from 
~" =  c(u,  p,  #,,,,  wf)  +  Uw=  -  <,,)  (C.7) 
and  substituting  the  solution for u  into the  compensated demand function 
(C.6). 
Since u cannot be solved from (C.7) explicitly, a numerical procedure has to 
be used. 
Note, incidentally, that the cost functions can be used to assess how much 
extra full income it takes to reach a utility level u in the rationed case compared 
to the unrationed case. HOUSEHOLD  LABOR SUPPLY  41 
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Summary 
THE SYSTEMS APPROACH TO HOUSEHOLD  LABOR SUPPLY 
IN THE NETHERLANDS 
Deaton and Muellbauer's 'Almost Ideal Demand System' is employed to model the joint deter- 
mination of family income and male and female labor supply of individual households in the 
Netherlands.  Family composition effects are incorporated as quasi-price effects, as originally 
proposed by Barten. The model is estimated for a cross-section of households in the Netherlands 
in 1982,  to explain both actual hours of work and preferred hours of work.  An analysis of the 
effects of rationing of male labor supply, by a mandatory reduction of the length of the working 
week, points to a sizeable compensating effect on female labor supply. 